Proactive Policing and the Legacy of Terry by Harmon, Rachel A. & Manns, Andrew
49
Proactive Policing and the Legacy of Terry
Rachel A. Harmon*
Andrew Manns**
INTRODUCTION
Fourth Amendment cases largely focus on a single aspect of policing: 
criminal investigation.  Terry v. Ohio revealed a different side of policing, one in 
which officers patrol urban streets and intervene to solve problems as they 
emerge.1 Though not complete, Terry¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRISROLFLQJLVIDUPRUHOLNH
everyday patrol policing than the characterization in most criminal procedure 
cases.  Yet, ironically, Terry made antiquated the very picture it drew.  
Contemporary policing often utilizes the tools Terry approved, investigative stops 
and frisks based on reasonable suspicion, not merely for the purpose of catching 
criminals, but more aggressively and programmatically.  Stops and frisks are now 
part of proactive policing strategies aimed at preventing would be criminals from 
seeking to violate the law in the first place.
Proactive policing may make constitutional violations more likely because²
when poorly implemented²it can encourage officers to engage in stops and frisks 
even when adequate suspicion is lacking or in a manner that discriminates.  Indeed, 
some scholars have claimed that proactive policing using widespread stops and 
frisks is inevitably unconstitutional.  More likely, proactive policing strategies can 
be designed to comply with constitutional law, at least under existing doctrine.  
Nevertheless, the widespread use of Terry¶V SHUPLVVLRQ VOLS FDQ LPSRVH
considerable harms on individuals and communities, and constitutional law does 
not adequately consider the trade-offs between the harms of proactive policing and 
its ability to deter crime.  Thus, states and localities need to decide whether and 
how best to use the proactive policing strategies that Terry has generated. Though 
constitutional litigation is inevitably limited in its capacity to regulate proactive 
policing, it has a role to play as well.  By generating data and raising the profile of 
proactive policing strategies, lawsuits can help facilitate the political process and 
jump-start state and local reform.  In this paper, we consider Terr\¶VUHODWLRQVKLSWR
these three kinds of policing: investigative policing, the kind appearing most often 
in Supreme Court cases other than Terry, in which police officers act primarily as 
criminal investigators; patrol policing, the standard model of policing, which 
appears in Terry and predominates in most departments; and proactive policing, 
enabled by Terry, which includes a variety of contemporary preventative policing 

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efforts that supplement traditional crime fighting.  The Terry Court recognized that 
constitutional law could not fully regulate policing on urban streets, even in its 
more traditional forms.  Constitutional doctrine is even less useful for contending 
with the new world of policing that Terry has wrought.  We argue that proactive 
policing that uses stops and frisks can probably be designed to comply with 
constitutional law.  Thus, it must be regulated in the political arena, where cities 
and states can decide whether and when it is worth its costs.  That political process 
necessitates that communities can engage in an accurate balancing of proactive 
SROLFLQJ¶VEHQHILWVDQGFRVWV/XFNLO\H[SHULHQFHVKRZVWKDWERWKOLWLJDWLRQefforts 
and statutory reforms can help facilitate that balancing.
I. INVESTIGATIVE POLICING AND TERRY
Local policing in the United States is dominated by patrol policing, also 
NQRZQ DV WKH ³VWDQGDUG PRGHO´ LQ ZKLFK GHSDUWPHQWV GHYRWH PRVW RI WKHLU
resources to responding to calls for service and random patrol.  One would not 
NQRZ WKLV IURP WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V FRQVWLWXWLRQDO FULPLQDO SURFHGXUH FDVHV
which since the mid-20th Century have overwhelmingly portrayed police officers 
engaged in and motivated by the reactive project of investigating crime.  Terry
represents a rare exception.
,Q WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V )RXUWK $PHQGPHQW FDVHV SROLFH RIILFHUV
overwhelmingly catch criminals and uncover crime.  To do so, they search homes 
and hotel rooms,2 listen to phone conversations,3 traipse through fields and yards,4
paw through garbage,5 fly over back yards,6 walk dogs up to houses,7 search 
containers and cars,8 send undercover agents and informants,9 look in computers 
and cell phones,10 interview bus passengers and airport travelers,11 stop and follow 

2 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 644 (1961); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 12 (1948).
3 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
4 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 297 (1987); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 
173 (1984).
5 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37±38 (1988).
6 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986).
7 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413 (2013).
8 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 44 
(1970); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 567 (1991); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 298 
(1999).
9 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 387 (1978); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 326±27
(1990).
10 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480±81 (2014); United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 
199, 202 (2d Cir. 2016).
11 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547±48 (1980); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 
429, 431±32 (1991); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 197±98 (2002).
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people and cars (electronically or otherwise),12 and arrest the suspects they find.13
Police address bombings, gambling, murder, check fraud, theft, driving while 
intoxicated, and²most persistently²illegal drugs.14
The CouUW¶VYLHZRISROLFHDVFULPLQDOLQYHVWLJDWRUVLVQRWHQWLUHO\VXUSULVLQJ
,W VWHPV IURP WKH &RXUW¶V H[SHULHQFH ZLWK ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW  %HIRUH WKH )RXUWK
Amendment applied to the states, that experience was almost exclusively federal.  
Federal law enforcement expanded dramatically in the first third of the 20th
Century, and the Court found itself repeatedly responding to Fourth Amendment 
challenges to FBI and other federal law enforcement agents searching, seizing, 
investigating, and interrogating suspects to solve crimes like illegal drug-
trafficking, bank robbery, kidnapping, and murder.15 On the rare occasion when 
non-IHGHUDOSROLFHFURVVHG WKH MXVWLFHV¶GHVNV ORFDODQG VWDWHRIILFHUVZHUHRIWHQ
involved in joint operations with federal law enforcement, or at least, in 
investigating crimes that also violated federal law.  The law that developed 
UHIOHFWHGIHGHUDOODZHQIRUFHPHQW¶VSXUSRVHVDQGLWVSURIHVVLRQDOLVP
In Johnson v. United States, for example, a Fourth Amendment case from 
1948, the Court considered a joint investigation in a hotel by a Seattle narcotics 
officer and federal agents based on a tip from a confidential informant.  The 
officers entered a hotel room without a warrant when they smelled burning opium 
and discovered drugs inside.  The CourW VFROGHG WKH ³]HDORXV RIILFHUV´ IRU
forgetting to get a warrant, noting that they failed to grasp the risk the Fourth 
Amendment protects against: probable cause should have been evaluated by a 
QHXWUDO PDJLVWUDWH UDWKHU WKDQ ³MXGJHG E\ WKH RIILFHU HQJDJHG in the often 
FRPSHWLWLYH HQWHUSULVH RI IHUUHWLQJ RXW FULPH´16 Perhaps no language better 
VXPPDUL]HV WKH &RXUW¶V YLHZ RI ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW DV SURIHVVLRQDO FULPH ILJKWHUV
who risk excessive devotion to their task.
The year after it decided Johnson, the Court incorporated the Fourth 
Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment in Wolf v. Colorado, and for the 

12 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 709±10 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 
278±79 (1983); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 
307, 309±10 (1959); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413±14 (1969); Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 226 (1983).
13 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 413 (1976); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 
577 (1980).
14 See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 386 (1914) (describing the unlawful search 
of a home by police in their attempts to gain a conviction); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29±
31 (1927) (describing the search of a resident and seizure of stamps); McNabb v. United States, 318 
U.S. 332, 333 (1943) (describing police work with informers to raid an illegal alcohol distribution 
ring); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 129±131 (1954) (describing a police investigation and 
VHL]XUHRID³IHGHUDOZDJHULQJWD[VWDPS´LQWKe breakup of a horse-race bookmaking scheme).
15 A Brief History: World War, Cold War, 1939±1953, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/history/brief-history/world-war-cold-war [https://perma.cc/65MD-KAYP] (last 
visited Sept. 2, 2017); SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 163±64, 170 (2d ed. 1998).
16 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13±14 (1948).
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first time applied constitutional rules governing searches and seizures to local law 
enforcement officers engaged in exclusively local policing. 17 Eleven years later, 
in Mapp v. Ohio, it extended the exclusionary rule as well, ensuring it would see 
many more local law enforcement cases.18 But even after Wolf and Mapp, the 
&RXUWFRQWLQXHGWRYLHZWKHSROLFHDV³WKHNQRFNDWWKHGRRU´UDWKHUWKDQWKHSDWURO
officer on the street.19 In Mapp, and subsequently in the Fifth Amendment context 
in Miranda v. Arizona, the Court acknowledged some distance between the 
circumstances of local and federal law enforcement.20 But in both cases, it did so 
only as a precursor to eliding any gap, arguing that federal and local law 
enforcement projects are not so different as to justify different rules.21
Incorporation doctrine, which applies the same constitutional rules to officers, 
whatever their employer, took the same view.22 Over time, differences between 
local and federal policing have faded from constitutional view.
Since Johnson, the Court has changed its view of many aspects of Fourth 
Amendment law.  But it has maintained a consistent view about what police do and 
why they do it.  In 2011, for example, in Kentucky v. King, it rejected the need for 
a warrant in circumstances remarkably similar to those in which Johnson required 
one.  Specifically, the Court permitted officers to enter without a warrant an 
apartment from which the smell of burning marijuana emanated and into which a 
drug suspect might have fled.23 <HWGHVSLWHWKH&RXUW¶VUDGLFDOO\GLIIHUHQWYLHZRI
the warrant requirement, King, like Johnson, is riddled with references to the 
investigative role of the police.  By King, the Court was far less worried about the 
need for checking law enforcement activity; if anything it worried that lower courts 
were too aggressive in regulating the police.  But its conception of the police 
project as dedicated to rooting out crime is the same, and it is not unique.  King
merely echoes Johnson; it does not quote it.24 Dozens of other cases do, using the 
³FRPSHWLWLYHHQWHUSULVHRIIHUUHWLQJRXWFULPH´ODQJXDJHWRGHVFULEHERWKWKHULVNV
and promise of investigative policing.25

17 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
18 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654±55 (1961).
19 See, e.g., id. at 644 (discussing the illegal entrance of officers into the home of Ms. Mapp 
IRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIGLVFRYHULQJ³SROLF\SDUDSKHUQDOLD´
20 See id. at 651±53; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 483±86 (1966).
21 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 650±51; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 486.
22 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10±11 (1964) (quoted in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
561 U.S. 742, 744 (2010)).
23 Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 456, 469 (2011).
24 In fact, the Court in King makes a vague effort to distinguish Johnson. Id. at 469 n.5 
(distinguishing the situation in Johnson because, unlike in King, the officers knocked and demanded 
entry before arresting Johnson and searching the room).
25 Even in Fourth Amendment cases on use of force, the Court has portrayed the police as 
criminal investigators and has justified the use of force on those grounds.  See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 
544 U.S. 93, 98±99 (2005) (discussing officer actions in a drug investigation and holding that 
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This portrayal of the police as criminal investigators was and is misleading.  
Most law enforcement officers are local, and most local police resources are 
devoted to responding to calls and to random patrol, in accordance with the 
standard model.26 In fact, more than two-thirds of local officers are assigned to 
patrol operations, which is more than four times as many as are assigned to 
investigations.27 On patrol, the paradigmatic police officer engages in traffic stops, 
solves problems for community members, addresses incidents they stumble over, 
and answers calls, many of which involve no allegations of criminal activity.28 In 
doing so, they exert a physical presence on the street, and thereby deter would-be
criminals.29 %\FRQWUDVW³FULPLQDOLQYHVWLJDWLRQSlays a relatively small role in the 
day-to-GD\DFWLYLWLHVRISROLFHGHSDUWPHQWV´RU IRU WKDWPDWWHU LQSXEOLF VDIHW\
given that few crimes are solved as a result of the work of investigators.30 Policing 
LQ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV ORRNV OLWWOH OLNH WKH &RXUW¶s view, in which police officers 
investigate reported crimes, surveil suspected criminals, and uncover conspiracies 
to engage in the kinds of crimes that are rarely reported.
By contrast, Terry captures important components of ordinary policing.  In the 
incident that precipitated the opinion and is described in it, Martin McFadden, a 
police officer, intervened to prevent a violent crime²an armed robbery of a 
jewelry store²perhaps just before it started.  Though McFadden was²
ironically²a detective, the opinion describes his years on patrol, in which he 
ZRXOG ³ZDON DQG ZDWFK´ WKH VWUHHWV RI GRZQWRZQ &OHYHODQG IRU SHRSOH ZKR
³GLGQ¶W ORRN ULJKW´ DQG VZRRS LQ WR LQYHVWLJDWH31 ,Q WKH &RXUW¶V DFFRXQW
McFadden was engaged in anticipatory street policing, that is, patrol rather than 

³>L@QKHUHQWLQ  DXWKRUL]DWLRQWRGHWDLQDQRFFXSDQWRIWhe place to be searched is the authority to 
XVHUHDVRQDEOHIRUFHWRHIIHFWXDWHWKHGHWHQWLRQ´
26 See AM. BAR FOUND., SURVEY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE 
UNITED STATES, JULY 1959: HISTORY AND STATUS REPORT 13±14 (1959); WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 61±82 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1965); 
Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Police Organization in the Twentieth Century, 15 CRIME & JUST. 51, 51 (1992).
27 BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP¶T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE 
DEPARTMENTS, 2013: PERSONNEL, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES   ³$ERXW RI ORFDO SROLFH
RIILFHUVZHUHDVVLJQHGWRSDWURORSHUDWLRQVDQGDERXWZRUNHGLQWKHLQYHVWLJDWLRQVDUHD´
28 CHRISTINE EITH & MATTHEW DUNROSE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP¶T OF 
JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2008, at 3 (2011).
29 Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & David J. Bordua, Environment and Organization: A Perspective on 
the Police, in THE POLICE: SIX SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS 25, 26 (David J. Bordua ed., 1967) (listing the 
many routine activities in which police are engaged); Egon Bittner, The Police on Skid-Row: A Study 
of Peace Keeping, 32 AM. SOC. REV. 699, 702±04 (1967) (describing the paradigmatic features of 
SROLFH³SHDFHNHHSLQJ´PRESIDENT¶S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 95 (1967) (describing the process by which 
police presence deters crime); Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME &
JUST. 199, 201 (2013).
30 NAT¶L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 73±
75 (2004).
31 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5 (1968).
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criminal investigation.  He was able to respond to events so promptly that he 
caught the criminals even before they finished their ignoble undertaking, but no 
one could mistake his actions for the kind of police work at the center of cases like 
Johnson.
(YHQ EH\RQG WKH VSHFLILFV RI 0F)DGGHQ¶V DFWLRQV WKH &RXUW PDGH YLVLEOH
everyday patrol as a constitutionally relevant phenomenon.  As the Court notes, 
³>H@QFRXQWHUV DUH LQLWLDWHGE\ WKHSROLFH IRU DZLGHYDULHW\RISXUSRVHV VRPHRI
which DUHZKROO\XQUHODWHG WRDGHVLUH WRSURVHFXWHIRUFULPH´VXFKDVDQHHG WR
keep the peace or deter violence without resorting to actual coercion.32 It 
GLVFXVVHG WKH UROH SROLFHPLJKW WDNH LQ ³KHOS>LQJ@ DQ LQWR[LFDWHG SHUVRQ ILQGKLV
way home, with no inteQWLRQ RI DUUHVWLQJ KLP´ RU KRZ WKH\ PLJKW ³VHHN>@ WR
PHGLDWH D GRPHVWLF TXDUUHO ZKLFK WKUHDWHQV WR HUXSW LQWR YLROHQFH´33 Even 
UHFRJQL]LQJ WKHZD\V WKDWRIILFHUVPLJKWXVH WKHLUSRZHU WRKDUDVV WKRVH ³ZKRVH
purpose for being abroad is not readily evident,´34 LVDZD\RIDFNQRZOHGJLQJ³WKH
myriad daily situations in which policemen and citizens confront each other on the 
VWUHHW´ 35
One could argue that Terry¶VGHVFULSWLRQRISROLFLQJLVVWLll flawed, or at least 
partial.  Though much of the opinion seems to recognize the varied public order 
DQGVDIHW\JRDOVRISROLFLQJLQFKDUDFWHUL]LQJWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VLQWHUHVWVDWVWDNHLQ
carrying out frisks, for instance, the Court assumes that policing remains motivated 
by the goal of ³FULPH SUHYHQWLRQ DQG GHWHFWLRQ´ FRQILQHG WR ³WKH OHJLWLPDWH
LQYHVWLJDWLYHVSKHUH´36 7KXV0F)DGGHQZRUULHGEHFDXVH³KHVXVSHFWHGWKH WZR
PHQRIµFDVLQJDMREDVWLFN-XS¶´37 $QGWKH&RXUWVRXJKWWRSURWHFWKLPLQ³WKH
SURSHUSHUIRUPDQFHRIWKHRIILFHU¶VLQYHVWLJDWRU\GXWLHV´38 The Terry Court even 
quotes Johnson¶V GHVFULSWLRQRI WKH ³FRPSHWLWLYH HQWHUSULVH´RISROLFLQJ39 As a 
UHVXOW RI WKH&RXUW¶V FRQIODWLRQ RI FULPLQDO LQYHVWLJDWLRQDQGSDWURO LW VRXQGV LQ
Terry DV LI³SDWUROPHQZDONDURXQG UHVSRQG WRVHUYLFHGHPDQGVRU LQWHUYHQH LQ
situations, with the provisions of the penal code in mind, matching what they see 
with some title or another, and deciding whether any particular apparent infraction 
LV VHULRXV HQRXJK WRZDUUDQW EHLQJ UHIHUUHG IRU IXUWKHU SURFHVV´40 But as Egon 
Bittner, the renowned sociologist, has pointed out, criminal law is more often the 

32 Id. at 13.
33 Id. at 13 n.9.
34 Id. at 14 n.11 (quoting PRESIDENT¶S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 184 (1967)).
35 Id. at 12.
36 Id. at 15, 22.
37 Id. at 6.
38 Id. at 8.
39 Id. at 12 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
40 Egon Bittner, Florence Nightingale in Pursuit of Willie Sutton: A Theory of the Police, in
POLICING VOLUME I: COPS, CRIME AND CONTROL: ANALYSING THE POLICE FUNCTION 155, 165 (Robert 
Reiner ed., 1996).
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tool of than the object of street policing.  Officers seek to impose temporary 
solutions on emergent situations that may need forcible resolution, and the power 
to arrest individuals for violations of criminal law is²for patrol officers at least²
more often an effective means of stopping problems than an end in itself.41
In this way, Terry described what policing looks like better than it described 
its aims.  Even so, Terry introduced a more accurate, more complex portrayal of 
the police than any earlier Fourth Amendment case.  Since Terry, the Court has 
more often taken note of police on patrol, usually in the context of traffic stops 
where evidence was produced,42 and more occasionally in pedestrian encounters or 
911 calls.43 This should be no surprise: the rule in Terry ensured that, at least in 
many cases, such encounters would be subject to judicial scrutiny.  The result is 
that, though policing as criminal investigation continues to dominate much of 
Fourth Amendment law, and Terry¶V SRUWUD\DO RI SDWURO SROLFLQJ SOD\V D VPDOOHU
role in Supreme Court cases than it does in actual policing, after Terry, patrol 
SROLFLQJLVDWOHDVWSDUWRIWKH&RXUW¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIODZHQIRUFHPHQW
II. CONTEMPORARY PROACTIVE POLICING
Much of urban policing today looks very different not only from the 
investigative policing the Court describes in many Fourth Amendment cases, but 
also from both the patrol policing that Terry portrays and its Bittnerian cousin.  
0F)DGGHQ¶VDFWLRQVZHUHSUHYHQWDWLYHRQO\LQWKHOLPLWHGVHQVHWKDWKHVWRSSHGD
crime that was about to happen, but they were fundamentally reactive in the sense 
that he waited for an indication of some problematic activity before he thought to 
interYHQH  2QH FDQ WKLQN RI0F)DGGHQ¶V SROLFLQJ DV DQ H[WUHPH IRUP RI UDSLG
response: he addressed crime so quickly that he caught it even before it occurred.  
That was precisely what his department wanted him to do when they placed him on 
the streets of Cleveland.  In the standard model of policing, officers are widely 
assigned to random preventative patrol to resolve disorder, catch criminals, and 
stop crime as it unfolds.44
Traditional patrol still exists, but overwhelmingly departments now also 
engage in policing that is preventative in a deeper sense.  Contemporary policing 
utilizes strategies designed to deter criminal behavior before it is contemplated.  As 

41 Id. DW³3ROLFHDUHHPSRZHUHGDQGUHTXLUHGWRLPSRVHRUDVWKHFDVHPD\EHFoerce a 
provisional solution upon emergent problems without having to brook or defer to opposition of any 
NLQG´
42 See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808 (1996) (involving plainclothes officers 
in an unmarked car following and ultimately pretextually stopping suspects); Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 107 (1977); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997).  See also 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 422±23 (1984) (considering whether a traffic stop constitutes 
custody under Miranda).
43 See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 
119, 121 (2000).
44 NAT¶L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 30, at 5.
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early as the late 1960s, Albert J. Reiss, Jr. and David Bordua distinguished 
policing based on a request for service from police-LQLWLDWHG RU ³SURDFWLYH´
policing.45 But proactive policing did not develop fully or spread widely in its 
contemporary form until the 1980s and 1990s,46 after a series of reports in the 
1970s and early 1980s raised serious doubts about the effectiveness of the 
traditional patrol model.47 The newer forms of proactive strategies are premised on 
the idea that, if the desirable outcome of policing is public safety and order, 
officers should be out there preventing problems from emerging, not just stopping 
them when they do.48
&RQWHPSRUDU\ SURDFWLYH ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW DOVR VRPHWLPHV FDOOHG ³WKH QHZ
SROLFLQJ´49 is not a single police activity or departmental strategy.  Instead, it 
includes a collection of innovative strategies, based on new criminological theories 
about how crime arises and how it can be stopped.  Hot Spots policing focuses 
police attention on very small areas that suffer persistent and frequent crime.50

45 See Reiss & Bordua, supra note 29, at 29; David J. Bordua & Albert J. Reiss, Jr., 
Command, Control, and Charisma: Reflections on Police Bureaucracy, 72 AM. J. SOC. 68 (1966).  
See also ALBERT J. REISS, JR., THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC ³:HKDYHWHUPHGWKHSROLFH
force . . . a proactive organization when it seeks criminal violations on itVRZQLQLWLDWLYH´ZKLFKLV
frequently credited with developing the term.
46 See NAT¶L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 30, at 24±25 (discussing the emergence of new 
methods of policing in the 1980s and 1990s).  See also David Weisburd & Anthony A. Braga, 
Introduction: Understanding Police Innovation, in POLICE INNOVATION: CONTRASTING PERSPECTIVES 
1, 9 (David Weisburg & Anthony A. Braga eds., 2006); David L. Weisburd & John E. Eck, What Can 
Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear?, 593 AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 42, 42 (2004); 
Cynthia Lum et al., The Evidence-Based Policing Matrix, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 3, 5 
(2011).
47 See, e.g., GEORGE L. KELLING ET AL., THE KANSAS CITY PREVENTIVE PATROL EXPERIMENT:
A SUMMARY REPORT 3 (1974) (finding that increase patrol did not affect levels of crimes, fear of 
crime, or citizen satisfaction); WILLIAM SPELMAN & DALE K. BROWN, NAT¶L INST. OF JUSTICE,
CALLING THE POLICE: CITIZEN REPORTING OF SERIOUS CRIME xix (1984) (indicating that rapid 
response was of limited use in addressing serious crime); JOHN E. ECK, POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH 
FORUM, SOLVING CRIMES: THE INVESTIGATION OF BURGLARY AND ROBBERY xiii (1983) (suggesting 
that criminal investigation has little impact on crime).
48 See NAT¶L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 30, at 5.  Other proactive strategies include 
focused deterrence policing and third-party policing.  See Anthony A. Braga & David L. Weisburd, 
Must We Settle for Less Rigorous Evaluations in Large Area-Based Crime Prevention Programs? 
Lessons from a Campbell Review of Focused Deterrence, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 573 
(2014) (discussing focused deterrence); Lorraine Mazerolle & Janet Ransley, The Case for Third-
Party Policing, in POLICE INNOVATION: CONTRASTING PERSPECTIVES 191 (David Weisburd & 
Anthony A. Braga eds., 2006) (discussing third-party policing).
49 See, e.g., Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: 
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997); EUGENE MCLAUGHLIN,
THE NEW POLICING (2007); Jeffrey Fagan et al., Stops and Stares: Street Stops, Surveillance and 
Race in the New Policing, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 621 (2016).
50 See DAVID WEISBURD, IDEAS IN AMERICAN POLICING: PLACE-BASED POLICING 2 (2008), 
https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Weisburd-2008-Place-Based-
Policing.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9MJ-FT6X]; POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, VIOLENT CRIME IN 
AMERICA: WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT HOT SPOTS ENFORCEMENT 3 (Craig Fischer ed., 2008), 
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Predictive policing depends on collections of public and government data and 
analytical algorithms to identify individuals, groups, or locations that are likely to 
be involved in future crime.51 Stop, Question, and Frisk (SQF) seeks to deter street 
criminal activity, such as drug and gun possession or violence, by raising the 
expected cost of engaging in them.52 In Problem-Oriented Policing, departments 
address clusters of similar incidents using a structured technique for identifying 
and addressing quality of life problems with the community.53 Broken Windows 
policing seeks to reduce urban disorder that might indicate an unmonitored 
neighborhood, in order to reduce crime.54 And Zero Tolerance policing targets 
visible, minor street crime as a means to prevent more serious criminal activity.55
As these brief descriptions suggest, proactive strategies are diverse in theory.  
They are also heterogeneous in the ways they are implemented.  Across the United 
States, departments leverage new technologies, community partnerships, and the 
substantial legal authority available to the police in a range of ways to prevent 
crime, sometimes combining more than one proactive strategy.  Despite this 
variety, however, very often proactive policing has in practice meant aggressively 
stopping and frisking individuals on the street in order to deter (rather than uncover 
or directly stymie) criminal activity.  Departments often apply Hot Spots and 
Predictive Policing by concentrating enforcement in the form of stops and frisks in 

http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/violent%20crime%20in%20america%
20-%20what%20we%20know%20about%20hot%20spots%20enforcement%202008.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XSA5-JWYJ] (stating that hot spots policing is the most widely used anti-violence 
strategy).
51 See CRAIG D. UCHIDA, NAT¶L INST. OF JUSTICE, A NATIONAL DISCUSSION ON PREDICTIVE 
POLICING: DEFINING OUR TERMS AND MAPPING SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES 1 (2009); 
Beth Pearsall, Predictive Policing: The Future of Law Enforcement?, 266 NAT¶L INST. JUST. J. 16 
(2010).
52 See James Q. Wilson & Barbara Boland, The Effect of the Police on Crime, 12 LAW &
SOC¶Y REV.   ³%\ VWRSSLQJ TXHVWLRQLQJ DQGRWKHUZLVH FORVHO\REVHUYLQJ FLWL]HQV
especially suspicious ones, the police are more likely to find fugitives, detect contraband (such as 
VWROHQSURSHUW\RUFRQFHDOHGZHDSRQVDQGDSSUHKHQGSHUVRQVIOHHLQJIURPWKHVFHQHRIDFULPH´
53 See Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach, 25 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 236 (1979); HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING (1990).
54 James Wilson and George Kelling first articulated the hypothesis that unaddressed disorder 
could lead to more serious criminal activity over time in their now-IDPRXV DUWLFOH WLWOHG ³%URNHQ
:LQGRZV´*HRUJH/.HOOLQJ	James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood 
Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982 at 4, https://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/politics/crime/
windows.htm [https://perma.cc/6UQ9-AMRH]. Broken Windows policing depends on the 
HQIRUFHPHQW RI ³Oaws and ordinances against such minor offenses as littering, panhandling, 
SURVWLWXWLRQ DQG RWKHU EHKDYLRUV JHQHUDOO\ JURXSHG XQGHU WKH WHUPV µLQFLYLOLWLHV¶ RU µSXEOLF
GLVRUGHUV¶´NAT¶L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 30, at 228±29.
55 WILLIAM BRATTON & PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND: HOW AMERICA¶S TOP COP REVERSED 
THE CRIME EPIDEMIC (1998); John E. Eck & Edward R. Maguire, Have Changes in Policing Reduced 
Violent Crime?: An Assessment of the Evidence, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 207, 224 (Alfred 
Blumstein & JoeO:DOOPDQHGV  ³]HUR-tolerance policing attempts to impose order through 
VWULFWHQIRUFHPHQW´
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the areas and against the people identified.  They implement Stop, Question, and 
Frisk by heavily embracing its eponymous activities.  When Problem-Oriented 
Policing identifies a problem, departments sometimes use intense enforcement in 
the form of stops and frisks as a method of addressing it.  Broken Windows and 
Zero Tolerance Policing so often target stops and frisks on those involved in low-
level crime and disorder that the strategies are conflated with Stop, Question, and 
Frisk.
In this way, proactive policing depends critically on the policing power 
permitted in Terry, and it does so in a manner unimaginable to the Terry Court.  
Once Terry put a constitutional Good Housekeeping Seal of approval on stops and 
frisks,56 they became a legitimate tool in the police toolkit, one that could be used 
in a forward-looking way, and with any frequency, so long as officers complied 
with the constitutional rules.  Thus, today, stops are carried out strategically to 
address long-term problems rather than immediate ones.  One might reasonably 
call Terry the foundation on which proactive policing is built.
Of course, Terry is not alone in providing support for programmatic, proactive 
enforcement.  Proactive strategies, especially Zero Tolerance and Broken 
Windows Policing, often depend on aggressive arrests for minor crimes as well as 
street stops.57 Wide-ranging codes of misdemeanor offenses help make that 
possible.58 6RGRVRPHRIWKH&RXUW¶VPRUHUHFHQW)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWFDVHVPRVW
notably, Whren v. United States, which allows pretextual arrests, and Atwater v. 
City of Lago Vista, which allows arrests even for minor fine-only offenses; these 
are arguably almost as helpful to some proactive strategies as Terry.59 But if Terry
is not the only case that facilitates proactive policing, it remains the first and most 
important one.  Whren was only decided in 1996, and Atwater in 2001, long after 
the major proactive policing strategies developed and began to be adopted.  By 
contrast, Terry was the legal framework around which proactive strategies formed.  
Proactive policing is made possible by Terry, and Terry as a result remains central 
to the contemporary policing project, even as the project has departed from the 
kind of policing that the Terry decision described. 
III. IS PROACTIVE POLICING CONSTITUTIONAL?
If proactive policing is an important part of Terry¶V OHJDF\ LW LV DOVR D
controversial one.  In recent years, in city after city²New York, Philadelphia, 

56 The History of the Good Housekeeping Seal, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING (Oct. 1, 2011), 
http://www.goodhousekeeping.com/institute/about-the-institute/a16509/good-housekeeping-seal-
history/ [https://perma.cc/CJV4-299L].
57 See NAT¶L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 30, at 228±29.
58 Alexandra Natapoff, A Stop is Just a Stop: Terry’s Formalism, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 113
(2017).
59 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (allowing pretextual arrests); Atwater v. 
City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (allowing arrests for fine-only crimes).
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Baltimore, Chicago, and most recently, Milwaukee²private plaintiffs and the 
Department of Justice have alleged that the aggressive use of stops and frisks 
arising from proactive policing strategies violates constitutional law.  Scholars 
agree, and they go further.60 For example, Tracey Meares has argued that the shift 
from stops and frisks as the Terry Court envisioned them to their new use created a 
fundamental mismatch between, on one hand, Terry¶V LQFLGHQW-specific analysis 
and the exclusionary rule context in which Terry claims are assessed, and on the 
other, the large scale, programmatic level at which the stops and frisks are directed 
and carried out.61 Similarly, Jeffrey Bellin argues that there is an inverse 
relationship between the effectiveness of a strategy of aggressive stops and frisks 
and its constitutionality on both Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment 
grounds, because deterring crime requires widespread and unconstitutionally 
arbitrary frisks within a narrow population.62 Both scholars suggest that effective 
proactive programs of stopping and frisking suspects are inevitably 
unconstitutional, at least under the best reading of constitutional law.  We disagree.  
Although the proactive use of stops and frisks may make constitutional violations 
more likely, it seems feasible to design a proactive strategy that uses stops and 
frisks aggressively and still complies with constitutional law.  However, just 
because a practice is constitutional does not make it a good idea.
Some proactive applications of stops and frisks likely lead to unconstitutional 
conduct.  The federal district court opinion in Floyd v. City of New York, which 
dHFODUHG 1HZ <RUN &LW\¶V XVH RI 6WRS 4XHVWLRQ DQG )ULVN XQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO
illustrates how poorly implemented proactive strategies can generate constitutional 
violations.63 $FFRUGLQJ WR WKH GLVWULFW FRXUW¶V ILQGLQJV WKH 1HZ <RUN 3ROLFH
Department created incentives for officers to engage in frequent stops and frisks: 
they favored officers who produced lots of them, and they punished those that did 
not.  Simultaneously, they did little to ensure that officers recorded each stop.  Nor 
did they otherwise supervise the constitutionality of the stops.64 Instead, they 

60 Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-
Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159 (2015); Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse 
Relationship Between the Constitutionality and Effectiveness of New York City "Stop and Frisk", 94 
B.U. L. REV. 1495 (2014).
61 Meares, supra note 60DW³$FULWLFDOEXWREVFXUHGLVVXHLVthe mismatch between the 
level of analysis at which the Supreme Court articulated the relevant test for constitutional 
justification of a stop-and-frisk in Terry v. Ohio and the scale at which police today (and historically) 
engage in stop-and-frisk as a pUDFWLFH´
62 Bellin, supra note 60DW³,IDIULVNFDQEHDYRLGHGE\DYRLGLQJFULPLQDODFWLYLW\VXFK
as trespassing, public marijuana smoking or public urination, people can comfortably carry guns 
unlawfully so long as they obey (or think they will obey) other laws while doing so.  Thus, a high 
YROXPHRIDUELWUDU\IULVNVLVHVVHQWLDOWRHIIHFWLYHO\GHWHUULQJJXQSRVVHVVLRQ´
63 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562±63 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (summarizing 
the finding of liability and the remedies imposed); Shira A. Scheindlin, A Chance to Reflect: 
Thoughts from the Author of  Floyd v. City of New York, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 35 (2017).
64 Floyd  ) 6XSS G DW  ³1RU GR VXSHUYLVRUV HQVXUH WKDW DQ RIILFHU KDV PDGH D
proper record of a VWRSVRWKDWLWFDQEHUHYLHZHGIRUFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\´
60 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol. 15:49
reinforced their commitment to quantity over quality with a disciplinary policy that 
resisted knowing whether an officer did wrong and rarely disciplined him when he 
did.  Even if officers wanted to follow the law, their training was so inadequate 
that they were often disabled from doing so.65 Police officers may be guided by 
factors other than material incentives as well, but it is hard to imagine that these 
kinds of departmental practices would not cause some officers to violate the 
Constitution.
'HVSLWH WKH SUREOHPV ZLWK 1HZ <RUN &LW\¶V SURJUDP KRZHYHU RQH FDQ
imagine a program of strategic, proactive stops and frisks that better complied with 
the Fourth Amendment.  First, constitutional law provides a low bar for lawful 
stops and frisks.  Reasonable suspicion that a person is involved in criminal 
activity is not a difficult standard for officers to meet to justify a stop.  The 
VXVSHFW¶V EHKDYLRU FDQ EH LWVHOI OHJDO DQG WKH RIILFHU¶V DQDO\VLV QHHd not be 
empirically valid for there to be reasonable suspicion.66 Moreover, a vast 
misdemeanor code provides police a large menu of potential criminal activity of 
which citizens might be suspected.  Thus, departments can probably ensure that 
every stop and frisk satisfies the constitutional standard and still conduct many of 
them.  After all, even in Floyd, the available evidence indicated that the majority of 
stops made by the New York Police Department under the SQF program appeared 
to comply with the Fourth Amendment.67
Second, proactive strategies often involve concentrating resources on hot 
spots in high crime areas.  While the reasonable suspicion standard demands 
individualized suspicion, officers are permitted to include contextual facts, such as 
the crime rate in the area, in forming that suspicion.  As a result, so long as police 
focus on high crime areas, they can effectively lower the behavior-based 
suspicious activity demanded for each stop.68 Thus, when departments concentrate 
their efforts, officers are more likely to be able both to satisfy the law and to 
embrace a substantial program of stopping and frisking individuals on the street.  
In addition, such programs are especially likely to be effective: a growing literature 
suggests that the best crime control programs are those that strategically 
concentrate enforcement efforts in very small geographic areas.69 Although Bellin 

65 Id. ³'HILFLHQFLHVZHUHDOVRVKRZQLQWKHWUDLQLQJRIRIILFHUVZLWKUHVSHFWWRVWRSDQGIULVN
DQGLQWKHGLVFLSOLQLQJRIRIILFHUVZKHQWKH\ZHUHIRXQGWRKDYHPDGHDEDGVWRSRUIULVN´
66 IlliQRLVY:DUGORZ86QRWLQJ³WKHIDFWWKDWWKHVWRSRFFXUUHGLQD
µKLJK FULPH DUHD¶ >LV@ DPRQJ WKH UHOHYDQW FRQWH[WXDO FRQVLGHUDWLRQV LQ D Terry DQDO\VLV´ FLWLQJ
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147±48 (1972)).
67 See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 582±83.  See also Report of Jeffrey Fagan at 55, Floyd v. 
City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ 01034 (SAS)), (concluding that 
at least 68.9 percent of stops were legally justified).
68 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that a frisk may 
be made automatically where a crime of violence is suspected and that for a non-violent crime an 
officer can develop reasonable suspicion based on something indicating weapon or non-compliance).
69 See, e.g., David Weisburd, Cody W. Telep & Brian A. Lawton, Could Innovations in 
Policing Have Contributed to the New York City Crime Drop Even in a Period of Declining Police 
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assumes that using stops and frisks to deter, at least as New York City did, requires 
applying stops and frisks on such a widespread and arbitrary basis that the 
department was unlikely to both deter and comply with Terr\¶VVWDQGDUGE\RXU
reasoning, the converse is probably true: the same programs that are most likely to 
be legal²because they focus on high crime areas, for example²also may be the 
most likely to be effective.
This reasoning suggests that a department could adopt a proactive policing 
strategy in which officers stop and frisk suspects based on reasonable suspicion in 
order to deter crime, especially in a geographically-focused way, and survive 
constitutional review.  Of course, ensuring that officers follow the law would 
require correcting the institutional problems that apparently caused the 
constitutional violations described in Floyd.  Officers might be required to write 
contemporaneous reports recording the justification for any stop or frisk, and 
departments might need to check those reports for both adequacy and accuracy, as 
well as discipline officers who failed to comply with reporting requirements or the
law.  But that too seems entirely possible.  And some of those institutional changes 
DUHPXFKHDVLHUWRLPDJLQHZKHQRQHFRQVLGHUVGHSDUWPHQWVEH\RQG1HZ<RUN¶V
which with nearly 35,000 officers²almost three times the size of the next biggest 
American police department²is simply sui generis.
In Floyd, plaintiffs argued and the Court found that the New York Police 
Department (NYPD) use of SQF violated the Equal Protection Clause as well as 
the Fourth Amendment.70 Meares argues that the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment violations are inevitably intertwined,71 and Bellin argues that racial 
profiling is essential to an effective SQF program because resource constraints 
would otherwise reduce the probability of being stopped below what is necessary 
to successfully deter carrying a firearms in public.72 Both overlooked the 
possibility of focusing deterrence by narrowing proactive policing geographically 
rather than demographically, something Hot Spots and Predictive Policing 
expressly endorse.  The same focused strategies that are most likely to produce 
stops that satisfy the Fourth Amendment may also be the most likely to be able to 
be carried out effectively and without discrimination.

Strength?: The Case of Stop, Question and Frisk as a Hot Spots Policing Strategy, 31 JUST. Q. 129, 
129 (2014) (suggesting that SQF targeted at specific hot spot areas allowed the NYPD to achieve 
deterrence with fewer stops and fewer officers).
70 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 540.
71 Meares, supra note 60 DW ³6FKHLQGOLQ¶V)ourth and Fourteenth Amendment liability 
findings are importantly intertwined, because racial disproportion in stops and frisks alone does not 
SURYLGHDIRXQGDWLRQIRUD)RXUWHHQWK$PHQGPHQWYLRODWLRQ´ See also Brando Simeo Starkey, A
Failure of the Fourth Amendment & Equal Protection’s Promise: How the Equal Protection Clause 
Can Change Discriminatory Stop and Frisk Policies, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 131 (2012).
72 Bellin, supra note 60DW³*LYHQUHVRXUFHFRQVWUDLQWVSURILOLQJEDVHGRQJHQGHUDJH
and race seemed perfectly logical to the NYPD, and that is presumably why senior officers 
DFNQRZOHGJHGWKHSUDFWLFH´
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Moreover, though critics of proactive policing often allege that proactive 
strategies discriminate, those arguments often seem to presume a more scrutinizing 
equal protection doctrine than presently exists.  The Floyd court found that New 
<RUN&LW\¶VSROLF\KDGGLVSDUDWHHIIHFWVRQEODFNVDQG+LVSDQLFVLQSDUWEHFDXVHLW
rejected using crime statistics as a benchmark measure of what stops and frisks 
would look like absent discrimination.73 Yet it is unclear that other courts would 
reject the crime benchmark.  It similarly found that the New York Police 
Department intentionally targeted blacks and Hispanics for stops and frisks based 
on statistical and limited direct evidence.  But that ruling was never subject to 
appeal, and it is not clear that a less sympathetic court would have found a 
discriminatory purpose on the same facts.74 Nor have the allegations in 
Philadelphia, Baltimore, Chicago, or Milwaukee that proactive policing leads to 
discrimination been tested in court.  In discrimination lawsuits unrelated to 
proactive policing, statistics showing a disproportionate number of stops of 
minorities have rarely been treated as sufficient to make out a showing of 
discriminatory purpose on their own, and courts have been reluctant to infer 
discrimination without a stronger foundation than the New York case provided.75
In fact, in one of WKHIHZ'HSDUWPHQWRI-XVWLFH¶VSDWWHUQRUSUDFWLFHVXLWVZKHUHDQ
equal protection claim was contested, the court found that there was no express 
racial classification or discriminatory intent despite evidence of a number of 
racially charged statements.  The court held that without context and absent a 
showing as strong as in Floyd ³WKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VH[SUHVVFODVVLILFDWLRQHYLGHQFH
falls far short of that found sufficient in [Floyd@´76 The court came to a similar 
conclusion with respect to discriminatory purpose.77 In the Fourteenth 

73 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 540.
74 See Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 645±48 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the use of 
data alone to demonstrate discriminatory intent and finding that policy documents telling officers to 
watch for Hispanics because of their disproportionate involvement in the drug trade were not enough 
to prove discriminatory intent guided the stops challenged in the case).
75 See United States v. Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 3d 272, 351±52 (M.D.N.C. 2015) 
(distinguishing Floyd on the grounds that the showing of racially discriminatory intent was based 
only on comments by the county sheriff); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding 
that bad subjective intent is within the purview of the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth 
Amendment); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264±66 (1977) 
³RIILFLDO DFWLRQ ZLOO QRW EH KHOG unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially 
disproportionate impact. . . .  Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. . . .  Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or Yick 
WoLPSDFWDORQHLVQRWGHWHUPLQDWLYH´Chavez, 251 F.3d at 637±45 (engaging in detailed analysis 
of statistical evidence of racial disparities in traffic stops and requiring that the evidence be able to 
point to similarly situated individuals or to appropriate benchmarks to demonstrate a discriminatory 
effect).  But see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886) (allowing an inference of 
discriminatory intent from statistics where an ordinance was enforced almost exclusively against a 
minority group).
76 Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 3d at 351.
77 Id. at 354±71.
2017] PROACTIVE POLICING AND THE LEGACY OF TERRY 63
Amendment context as well as the Fourth, one suspects that many proactive uses 
of Terry¶VWRROVHYHQVRPHZKDWXQIRFXVHGRQHVFRXOGSDVVFRQVWLWXWLRQDOPXVWHU
Scholars have argued that if the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth 
Amendment doctrines do not prevent the proactive use of stops and frisks, the 
doctrines should change to accommodate these concerns.78 But they could hardly 
be less likely to do so.  To the contrary, the Court has been increasingly permissive 
about what constitutes reasonable suspicion in recent years, and it is almost 
unimaginable that it will become substantially more scrutinizing about Equal 
Protection violations anytime soon.79
More importantly, even if the law evolved to restrict stops and frisks further,
WKH GRFWULQH¶V SHUPLVVLYH QDWXUH LV QRW HSLSKHQRPHQDO  ,W LV WKH QDWXUH RI
constitutional rights, and especially Fourth Amendment rights, not to weigh 
individual interests fairly against those of the government.  Rights are always 
framed as a ceiling on government action rather than an account of what police 
officers should do to ensure that law enforcement is worth the harms it imposes.  
Thus, even if Fourth Amendment reasonableness purports to engage in balancing 
of government and individual interests, in the end, it tells the police what they 
cannot do, not what they should.80 In addition, those rights are likely to be more 
permissive to law enforcement than a fair weighing of the interests would reflect, 
both because they are set in advance by inexpert judges bent on preserving law 
enforcement flexibility and because they are designed to accommodate the needs 
of courts applying them as well as the police.81 Finally, since rights are held and 
enforced by individuals, usually with respect to specific actions, they do not do a 
good job of measuring²and can sometimes obscure²aggregate costs and benefits 
of policing, something communities care enormously about.82 Thus, it should 
come as no surprise that doctrines defining the scope of constitutional rights might 
permit stops and frisks that are socially very costly.
The Court often assumes that resource constraints are sufficient to check 
against police officers inappropriately capitalizing on permissive Fourth 
Amendment doctrines to tread upon individuals when the circumstances do not 

78 Other scholars, recognizing that proactive policing might well be constitutional under the 
Fourteenth Amendment have argued that we should squeeze challenges to proactive policing into 
other legal boxes.  Aziz Huq, for example, proposes using Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to 
declare the proactive practice illegal on the ground that it imposes a disparate impact, though he 
DFNQRZOHGJHV WKH ODZ SURYLGHV DQ ³LPSUHFLVH ILW´ $]L]=+XT The Consequences of Disparate 
Policing: Evaluating Stop -and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397
(forthcoming 2017 draft ed.), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2845540 [https://
perma.cc/7JBR-AJ3R].
79 See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (holding that an anonymous tip from an 
eyewitness made through 911 is sufficient to support a finding of reasonable suspicion).
80 Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 763 (2012).
81 Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307, 329±31 (2016); see also Atwater 
v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001).
82 See Harmon, supra note 80, at 777.
64 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol. 15:49
warrant an intrusion.  Specifically, the Court imagines that when criminal conduct 
is minor or especially equivocal, an officer would usually have no interest in 
pursuing it, even when allowed by the Constitution to do so.83 Thus, formulating 
constitutional law to protect against that problem is thought to be unnecessary.  In 
proactive policing, however, pursuing equivocal conduct can have outsized 
deterrence benefits.84 One could even argue, as Bellin does, that for proactive 
policing, inefficiency helps rather than hurts, because it generates greater 
deterrence.85 Thus, not only is the Fourth Amendment likely to be permissive 
compared to a full weighing of privacy, autonomy, and bodily integrity interests at 
stake in stops and frisks, but one of the usual checks against the abuse of that 
freedom²limited resources²does not apply to proactive policing.86 Given the 
&RXUW¶VPHDJHU UHFRJQLWLRQ RI WKH UHDOLWLHV RI SROLFLQJTerry notwithstanding, it 
seems especially unlikely that the Court would recognize how flawed this 
assumption is with respect to proactive policing.
Constitutional law, and in particular the Fourth Amendment, is no better 
VXLWHG WR HYDOXDWH SURDFWLYH SROLFLQJ¶V EHQHILWV WKDQ LW LV WR FKHFN LWV FRVWV
Although the Court nominally balances the individual and government interests, it 
does not consider how well law enforcement strategies serve the government 
interest at issue.  Thus, the Court does not consider whether an intrusive policing 
practice is effective or whether it is more effective than less intrusive alternatives, 
i.e., whether it is harm efficient, when deciding whether the practice is reasonable 

83 See Atwater86DW³LWLVLQWKHLQWHUHVWRIWKHSROLFHWROLPLWSHWW\-offense arrests, 
ZKLFKFDUU\FRVWV WKDWDUHVLPSO\ WRRJUHDW WR LQFXUZLWKRXWJRRGUHDVRQ´9LUJLQLDY0RRUH
U.S. 164, 174 (2008) (pointing out that cost-savings might lead to limits on police authority to seize 
individuals).  Recently, some justices have noted that new technologies dramatically reduce the 
resources necessary for the government to intrude upon individual privacy.  United States v. Jones, 
 6 &W    6RWRPD\RU - FRQFXUULQJ ³EHFDXVH *36 PRQLWRULQJ LV FKHDS LQ
comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it 
evades the ordinary checks WKDW FRQVWUDLQ DEXVLYH ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW SUDFWLFHV µOLPLWHG SROLFH
UHVRXUFHVDQGFRPPXQLW\KRVWLOLW\¶´ TXRWLQJ,OOLQRLVY/LGVWHU86 Id. at 
$OLWR-FRQFXUULQJ³,QWKHSUH-computer age, the greatest protections of privacy were neither 
constitutional nor statutory, but practical.  Traditional surveillance for any extended period of time 
ZDVGLIILFXOWDQGFRVWO\DQGWKHUHIRUHUDUHO\XQGHUWDNHQ´
84 Bellin, supra note 60DW³7KH1<3'¶VHPEUDFHRIDFLW\ZLGHVWUDWHJy of mass stop-
and-frisk to deter gun possession and thus gun violence can, perhaps, be defended on public policy 
JURXQGV´
85 Similarly, the failure to turn up a crime is not a persuasive argument against stops and 
frisks carried out under a proactive policing strategy, since stops and frisks can deter whether or not 
they effectively discover criminal activity.
86 Of course, resource constraints might not check intentional harassment, a concern Terry
mentions.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14±15 (1968).  But since Terry, the Court has repeatedly 
stated that the Fourth Amendment does not address subjective motivation by the police, and has 
suggested in doing so, that there are not enough bad actors for this to be a major problem with Fourth 
Amendment protection.  See, e.g., Atwater  86 DW  ³>7@KH FRXQWU\ LV QRW FRQIURQWLQJ
anything like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-RIIHQVHDUUHVWV´:KUHQY8QLWHG6WDWHV86
³6XEMHFWLYHLQWHQWLRQVSOD\QRUROHLQRUGLQDU\SUREDEOH-cause Fourth Amendment 
DQDO\VLV´
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for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.87 Though one could imagine the doctrine 
being otherwise, perhaps this is for the best: the Court is surely not in a strong 
position to assess controversial questions of criminology.  Nevertheless, the 
consequence is that Fourth Amendment doctrine is devoid of the kind of analysis 
that might indicate whether a policing practice is reasonable in the important sense 
of being worth doing.
All this leaves us in the following position.  The Terry Court accommodated 
ODZHQIRUFHPHQW¶VQHHGWRUHVSRQGWRLQFLGHQW-specific events by legitimizing stops 
and frisks under a new standard, requiring less suspicion than probable cause.  
Since then, that tool has been turned into a diffuse weapon, like a form of tear gas, 
in proactive policing.  It imposes largely temporary harms in order to deter and 
control.  Neither the Terry opinion itself nor subsequent case law gives courts a 
way to easily check this use of Terry, which is no surprise in light of the structure 
and limits of the law.  While some departments have likely violated the 
Constitution in implementing proactive stops and frisks, well-designed proactive 
policing programs that utilize stops and frisks probably could pass constitutional 
muster.  Terry has therefore facilitated an important shift in policing in the United 
States, one that has the potential to promote public safety but also impose 
significant costs, and one which constitutional law is unlikely to regulate well.
IV. REGULATING PROACTIVE POLICING
If Terry¶VUHDVRQDEOHVXVSLFLRQIUDPHZRUNLVQRWZHOO-designed to adequately 
balance the harms and benefits of proactive policing through stops and frisks, how 
will the practice be governed?  As we usually govern the police: mostly through 
local political systems and state law.88
Ordinarily, police chiefs and their top commanders determine policing 
strategy.  But they do so subject to a range of formal and informal influences.  
Formally, chiefs can usually be easily fired, they operate within the constraints of 
state and local law, and they are limited to what is authorized in their department 
budgets.  Less formally, chiefs and their command staff are subject to constant 
input from a raft of constituencies, including officers and their representatives; 
citizens and neighborhood groups; business leaders; city managers; mayors; and 
councilmembers. 89 The last two of these are in turn also subject to direct political 
review.  This system creates a complicated mechanism for registering public 
concerns both about crime and about the costs of policing and ensuring that 
policing policy accords with it.90

87 See Harmon, supra note 80, at 763.
88 See Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 870, 940±43, 954 (2015).
89 See id. at 940±41.
90 Id.
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Local politics are an imperfect check on the harms of proactive policing, just 
DVWKH\DUHLPSHUIHFWDWFKHFNLQJSROLFLQJ¶VRWKHUFRVWV0DMRULWDULDQLQWHUHVWVDUH
more likely to focus on crime control than the costs policing imposes on 
individuals, which may get short shrift in the political calculus, at least when fear 
of crime is high.  Relatedly, the costs of policing are often concentrated on those 
without a lot of political power, namely, those who live in low-income, high crime 
areas, and are suspected to be criminal.  Thus, policing often is more intrusive, 
especially against some, than a fair weighing of the costs and benefits would 
warrant, and those harms are often unfairly distributed.91 But, even with these 
imperfections, the local political process ensures that community concerns 
influence law enforcement and it remains the primary way policing is governed.
Short of state or federal laws banning proactive policing²which are 
inconceivable²the local political process will govern proactive policing too.  But 
as with traditional policing, good proactive policing decisions are hardly 
inevitable.  Think about how hard those decisions are.  A police chief must 
integrate all of the competing voices to develop a neighborhood-specific and 
historically-contextualized understanding of community concerns both about 
safety and order and about interactions with law enforcement.  The latter must 
include how citizens experience the inconvenience, autonomy, privacy, bodily 
integrity, and dignity harms at stake, and whether enforcement may be (or may 
appear) unfairly distributed.  All that is in addition to figuring out what effects 
different strategies may have.
Though constitutional law may not dictate proactive policing policy, civil 
rights lawyers nevertheless have a significant role to play in shaping the calculus 
that cities and police chiefs use in developing their policing practices.  
Constitutional litigation can obviously spark changes when plaintiffs are able to 
win on the merits.  But it can also prompt change through settlements, especially 
those for injunctive or declaratory relief, even when²as in the case of challenges 
to proactive policing²the law seemingly provides limited leverage for plaintiffs.  
Moreover, in many contexts, high litigation and reputation costs may make a suit 
without a perfect claim on the merits worth settling.  Many of the federal 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V SROLFH UHIRUP VXLWV XQGHU 86&   KDYH EHQHILWHG IURP
exactly this dynamic.  Thus, constitutional litigation may work to promote policing 
that is worth its harms, at least to some degree, even when the underlying 
constitutional doctrine does not.
Constitutional litigation is also surprisingly powerful at facilitating the 
political process.  Specifically, lawsuits can be used to generate additional data 
about what the police are doing.  For example, pre-Floyd litigation against the 
NYPD settled in a consent decree that committed the NYPD to collecting and 
making available the UF-250s²the forms on which police recorded Terry stops 

91 Id.
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and frisks.92 Those UF-250s became the basis foU-HIIUH\)DJDQ¶VH[SHUWUHSRUWLQ
Floyd, which declared SQF unconstitutional.93 But equally important, because the 
settlement also made the data public, it allowed a much richer public debate about 
stops and frisks and their value.  For example, the data made possible the New 
York Times¶V LQWHUDFWLYH PDS ZKLFK DOORZHG UHVLGHQWV WR VHH KRZ PDQ\ VWRSV
occurred on their block and to see the density of stops in the city overall.94 As a 
UHVXOWERWKWKHMXVWLILFDWLRQVIRUWKH1<3'¶VVWRSVDQGWKHLUGLVWULEXWLRnal effects 
were far better understood.
In New York City, the litigation led to data, which in turn, led to public 
debate.  In other localities, constitutional litigation has led to legislative action, 
including the passage of statutes mandating data collection and placing restrictions 
on police authority to engage in certain kinds of activities.  In Chavez v. Illinois 
State Police, for example, the American Civil Liberties Union challenged a 
practice of traffic stops alleged to be in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  The litigation was ultimately unsuccessful, in part because the 
plaintiffs lacked the data needed to effectively demonstrate a disparate impact and 
discriminatory intent, or even to determine the basis for a number of traffic stops.95
Though the litigation failed in the courts, it ultimately prompted the state 
legislature to recognize the coercive costs of traffic stops.96 The Illinois State 
legislature passed laws mandating data collection on traffic stops and requiring 
police officers to record reasons for their stops.97 Laws such as these help to 
facilitate future accountability by making practices more visible and the coercive 
costs of the activities more apparent to the voting public.  A similar suit in 

92 See Historic Case: Daniels, et al., v. the City of New York, CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS, https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/daniels-et-al-v-city-new-york [https://
perma.cc/ABL9-5))@ODVWPRGLILHG2FW³7KHVHWWOHPHQWDJUHHPHQWUHTXLUHVWKDWWKH
NYPD audit officers who engage in stop-and-frisks, and their supervisors, to determine whether and 
to what extent the stop-and-frisks are based on reasonable suspicion and whether and to what extent 
the stop-and-frisks are being documented.  The results of these audits were to be provided to CCR on 
DTXDUWHUO\EDVLV´
93 See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
94 See Stop, Question and Frisk in New York Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/07/11/nyregion/20100711-stop-and-frisk.html [https://
perma.cc/9LE3-6K4V].
95 See Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 641±48 (7th Cir. 2001).
96 See Bob Secter, Obama Sponsored Illinois Law to Keep Data on Race, Traffic Stops, CHI.
TRIB. (July 24, 2009), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-07-24/news/0907230938_1_white-
drivers-searched-motorists [https://perma.cc/4D8X-NTPA]; Will Guzzardi, ACLU: Illinois State 
Police Show Racial Bias in Traffic Stops, HUFFINGTON POST (June 7, 2011, 4:07 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/07/aclu-illinois-state-polic_n_872586.html [https://perma.cc/8B
CE-&<:<@FLWLQJWKHOHJDOGLUHFWRURIWKH$&/8,OOLQRLVVWDWLQJ³WKDWWKHUHZDVQ¶WVXIILFLHQWGDWDWR
prove the [Chavez] case. . . . then-VWDWHVHQDWRU%DUDFN2EDPDDQGRWKHUVSXVKHGWKURXJKWKH>ODZ@´
97 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-212 (2011) (requiring data collection on traffic stops).
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Maryland led not only to a state law mandating data collection, but also to 
substantive prohibitions on the use of racial profiling by state police.98
In addition, litigation²again, even when not entirely successful²can 
strengthen the salience of a policing practice, giving it a sufficient public profile to 
ensure scrutiny of the costs of that program and possible electoral consequences as 
a result.  In this way, litigation facilitates political accountability and makes the 
costs of policing an important part of the local political process.  This appears to 
have happened in New York City, at least to some degree.  The plaintiffs won in 
Floyd, and the decision is influential, but that decision would not have been the last 
word in the expected litigation.  Given the issues, it is not clear that either the 
liability decision or the remedy would have fared well on appeal.  That question 
was never answered because political events overcame legal ones.  In the presence 
of intense public and media debate following the Floyd decision, Bill de Blasio, a 
long-shot candidate, bet his political future on opposing the SQF policy, and won 
that bet.99 After he took office, he withdrew the appeal, ending further litigation of 
WKHPHULWVDJUHHGWRWKH&LW\¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHFRXUW-run remedial process; and 
KDV VXEVWDQWLDOO\ FKDQJHG 1<3'¶V SUDFWLFHV ZLWK UHVSHFW WR VWRSV DQG IULVNV LQ
New York City.100 For proactive policing, as for other areas of policing policy, 
effective local governance depends on developing and making transparent 
sufficient information about policing to allow judgments about how well local 
officials are performing and then raising public attention to make those calls.101 At 
the end of the day, politics, not law, decided what was best for the City of New 
York.  But law helped.
Effective governance also requires effective means of influencing public 
officials and police chiefs and controlling agency costs.  Law can help here too, but 
usually in the form of statutes rather than litigation.  Local governments can set up 

98 Press Release, ACLU, ACLU, Civil Rights Groups and Maryland Officials Reach 
Landmark Racial Profiling Settlement, (Apr. 2, 2003), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-civil-rights-
groups-and-maryland-officials-reach-landmark-racial-profiling-settlement?redirect=racial-justice/
aclu-civil-rights-groups-and-maryland-officials-reach-landmark-racial-profiling-settlement [https://
perma.cc/Q3H6-6PDC]; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Maryland Restricts Racial Profiling in New Guidelines 
for Law Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/26/us/
maryland-restricts-racial-profiling-in-new-guidelines-for-law-enforcement.html?_r=0 [https://perma.
cc/J98H-A3GL].
99 See, e.g., Michael Barbaro, The Ad Campaign: De Blasio Speaks Against Stop-and-Frisk 
Tactics, N.Y. TIMES: CITY ROOM (Aug. 19, 2013), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/19/the-
ad-campaign-de-blasio-speaks-against-stop-and-frisk/ [https://perma.cc/ZXY2-H2BB] (examining de 
%ODVLR¶VVHFRQGFDPSDLJQFRPPHUFLDOZKLFKGHDOWZLWKKLVRSSRVLWLRQWRVWRS-and-frisk).
100 Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City Will Settle Suits on Stop-
and-Frisk Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2014) https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/nyregion/de-
blasio-stop-and-frisk.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/45D7-TXHX].
101 See Harmon, supra note 88, at 944; NAT¶L COMM¶N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENF¶T, NO. 14,
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a range of political structures, some of which facilitate accountability far better 
than others.  Though hiring and firing power over police chiefs and budgetary 
controls are the most common means of direct political influence over the police, 
they are not the only ones.  For example, local governments can add on processes 
to check especially intrusive local policing.  Consider a recent Seattle ordinance 
passed after controversy about police surveillance.  The rule requires that all police 
department acquisitions of surveillance equipment be approved by a vote of the 
city council.  In this way, Seattle subjected intrusive widespread police practices to 
further public debate and scrutiny.102 Of course, legislation and litigation can 
interact.  As the Floyd litigation progressed, the New York City Council was 
prompted to pass legislation creating the office of the NYPD inspector general to 
assess the practices and policies of the department and creating a new private cause 
of action to address alleged abuses.103
States have also found ways to regulate the coercive aspects of policing and 
align accountability mechanisms.  For instance, many states bar local police 
departments from directly benefiting from funds generated through civil asset 
forfeiture.  By doing so, the states remove local incentives for police to engage in 
more aggressive enforcement against crimes likely to lead to forfeiture and 
localities to maintain their control over the funding of local departments.  The 
federal Equitable Sharing Program allows police departments to bypass those 
restrictions, at least in some circumstances.104 But states are starting to resist that 
bypass too: California, Nebraska, and New Mexico have all recently restricted 
local police department use of the federal program.105 In the context of police 
surveillance, states have passed regulations requiring additional scrutiny when 
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police seek to use surveillance technology.106 States have placed legal limits on 
arrests as well, with state statutes requiring officers to issue citations rather than 
make arrests.107 States might similarly consider whether proactive policing 
justifies any additional restrictions.
There is some precedent for regulating proactive policing, at least the 
proactive policing that uses stops and frisks, through statutes and local ordinances.  
Notably, there have been statutory limits on stops and frisks since early the early 
days of the practice, long before Terry.  So-FDOOHG³ZDWFKPHQ´ZHUHDXWKRUL]HGWR
temporarily detain suspicious persons under statutory law in 17th Century
England.108 These statutes specified under what circumstances detention was 
allowed, for how long the person could be detained, and when they were required 
to be released.  When stops and frisks emerged as a more frequently used tactic in 
the late 19th Century, courts in New York and California debated whether the 
practice was permitted under pre-existing statutory authority.109 To resolve the 
question, a number of states passed statutes authorizing²and limiting²stops and 
frisks.110 Still, today, a number of states provide officers stop and frisk authority 
by statute.  But most of those statutes were passed just before or just after Terry.  If 
anything, Terry stymied rather than facilitated statutory development.111 Although 
some states passed statutes around the time of Terry, and some statutes have added 
further regulations around racial profiling and the length of detention for stops,112
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most have left stops and frisks to whatever constitutional constraints exist on local 
police departments.  Given that the proactive use of stops and frisks raises new 
concerns, perhaps it is time for legislatures to revisit whether the constitutional 
limits remain the right ones.
CONCLUSION
Terry v. Ohio provides a critical window into an important fact about local
law enforcement: The criminal investigation that appears in most Fourth 
Amendment cases has long been far less representative of American policing than 
the street patrol carried out by Officer McFadden.  Yet Terry also made possible a 
form of policing that changes the very picture Terry GHVFULEHG:LWKWKH&RXUW¶V
imprimatur, police departments have developed and adopted a wide range of 
proactive strategies that use stops and frisks proactively, strategically, and 
preventatively, in a manner unimagined by the Court.  Constitutional law does not 
provide a meaningful way of evaluating the policing that is Terry¶VOHJDF\6WDWHV
and localities should therefore rethink leaving stops and frisks to the constitutional 
DUHQD  ,QVWHDG UHJXODWLQJ WRGD\¶V SROLFLQg will require an approach that takes 
seriously the input and assessment of the communities being served.
